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1 Introduction
The maternal instinct leads a woman to prefer a tenth share in a rst rate man
to the exclusive possession of a third rate George Bernard Shaw In Maxims for
Revolutionists (1903)
The last ve decades have witnessed an important growth of the literature on two-sided
matching and its applications to the marriage market. Most studies, however, have focused on
the formation of relationships in monogamous societies, with little attention paid to polygyny,
a form of plural marriage involving one man and more than one woman, which has existed
for millennia and continues to exist in many contemporary societies. Therefore, di¤erences
in marriage patterns and outcomes across societies with di¤erent matrimonial cultures have
not been su¢ ciently studied. In this paper, we propose a simple model of a mating economy
to analyze and compare marriage in monogamous and polygynous societies. We subsequently
derive implications for how polygyny a¤ects male and female fertility at both the individual
and aggregate levels.
The focus on fertility as an outcome naturally comes from the fact that the desire for
progeny is generally regarded as one of the strongest appeals of polygyny: a large number of
children in a household constitutes an important workforce, ensures family continuity through
reproduction, and brings prestige to parents. However, the question of how polygyny a¤ects
fertility has not been resolved in the literature. Tertilt (2005) nds that women living in
polygynous countries have 2.2 more children than those in monogamous countries. In an
earlier work, however, Muhsam (1956) found that the number of children was 32 percent lower
for women married to polygynous men than for their counterparts married to monogamous
men. Busia (1954), on the other hand, found no signicant di¤erence in the fertility of women
in monogamous relationships and those married to polygynists.
These previous studies clearly show that the e¤ect of polygyny on fertility varies signi-
cantly, and may also depend on whether it is assessed at the individual level or at the aggregate
level. There is therefore a need to understand the mechanism through which polygyny a¤ects
fertility. Ideally, such a mechanism should also shed light on the characteristics of individ-
uals who choose to be involved in a polygynous marriage, and elucidate the role that these
individual characteristics play in the relationship between polygyny and fertility.
1.1 An overview of the model
The model proposed in this paper assumes a world in which agents marry in the rst period
and produce children in the second. First, we consider a two-sided mating economy involving
men and women. These men and women are ranked according to objective criteria. Each
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individual derives utility from having a marital relationship with an individual of the opposite
sex, and a higher-ranked individual is more desired as a partner. We study the equilibrium
matching of this economy in both the monogamous and the polygynous cultures, and derive
implications for how polygyny a¤ects the marriage rate, and how individual characteristics
determine the likelihood of entering a polygynous marriage. Building on this, the second
component of the model analyses the relationship between polygyny and fertility.
In our two-sided mating economy model, the assumption that the social rank of an in-
dividual determines his/her desirability as a partner is consistent with experimental studies
that have found that women look for status and wealth in men, whereas men look for beauty
in women (Todd et al. 2007). Similarly, Becker (1974) assumes an objective ranking of men
and provides an argument for why a woman would want to marry a high-status man who
might attract other wives in a culture of polygyny.2 Following Beckers work, many studies
assume partner selection to be based on one characteristic (e.g., wages, income, education,
height, weight, body mass index) or a set of characteristics combined into a single objective
variable (e.g., Becker 1981; Pencavel 1998; Choo and Siow 2006; Chiappori, Ore¢ ce, and
Quintana-Domeque 2012). However, as we explain later, our models di¤er signicantly.
We show that there exists a unique equilibrium matching under each of the two matrimo-
nial cultures considered in the analysis. For each of these cultures, we describe this equilibrium
in terms of the number and quality of partners that each individual obtains. In a monogamous
culture, men match with women of comparable rank, meaning that high-status men match
with attractive women, whereas low-status men match with unattractive women. In a polygy-
nous culture, women match with men whose status is comparatively higher than their beauty
rank. Moreover, beautiful women are more likely to enter a polygynous relationship, with
the number of co-wives increasing with the social status of their husband. Intuitively, this is
driven by the fact that higher-ranked individuals are more desirable as partners, therefore a
beautiful woman is more likely to marry a high status man, who also attracts other women.
Departing from the traditional literature on marriage, we further extend our mating econ-
omy model to allow for the possibility of beauty being judged subjectively by men, that is, each
man is allowed to have a di¤erent ranking of women. Remarkably, this extension preserves
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium matching in each matrimonial culture.
Analyzing the implications of these results for marriage rate, we nd that allowing polygyny
increases all womens chances of getting married. This implies that the aggregate number of
marriages is higher in a polygynous culture than in a monogamous culture.
In the second component of the theory, we study the e¤ect of polygyny and polygyny
prevalence on fertility at both the individual and aggregate levels. In the model, each individ-
2Becker (1974) supports the view expressed in our introductory quote, and argues that prohibiting polyg-
yny may be seen as an example of "discrimination" against women. Indeed, he writes that an "alternative
interpretation of the religious and legislative strictures against polygyny is that they are an early and major
example of discrimination against women, of a similar mold to the restrictions on their employment in certain
occupations, such as the priesthood, or on their ownership of property."
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ual derives utility from the number of children and from other consumption goods. It is also
assumed that the number of children increases the prestige rank of their parents. We derive
the following predictions.
First, a woman in a monogamous relationship has more children than a woman in a polyg-
ynous relationship, unless the preference for children relative to other consumption goods is
too strong, in which case, the opposite might hold. Indeed, a woman involved in a polygynous
relationship competes with her co-wives for the mans attention and resources, which, under
certain natural assumptions, leads to a smaller number of children than she would have if
she were the only wife. This negative e¤ect of polygyny on female fertility at the individual
level holds as long as resources are allocated in xed proportions between children and other
goods, or if the marginal value of children is not too high. When the preference for children
is su¢ ciently strong, polygyny positively a¤ects female fertility. These ndings imply that
the e¤ect of polygyny on fertility at the individual level might vary across cultures, following
variation in the value attached to children. In contrast, polygyny unambiguously positively
a¤ects male fertility, since the number of children that a man produces is the sum of children
born to his wives.
Second, although the e¤ect of being involved in a polygynous relationship on female fertility
is ambiguous, polygyny prevalence under natural assumptions increases aggregate fertility
through two distinct channels: (1) by increasing the number of marriages as argued earlier;
and (2) by triggering fertility contagion: any individual, whether involved in a monogamous or
polygynous relationship, tends to produce more children as polygyny becomes more prevalent
in his/her neighborhood.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst to document the contagious e¤ect of
polygyny on fertility, even among monogamous women. We show that the contagious e¤ect of
polygyny on individual fertility proceeds from fertility itself being contagious in the sense that
the number of children that an individual produces is positively a¤ected by the number of
children produced by other individuals in his/her neighborhood. This is because the number
of children determines the "prestige rank" of parents. Therefore, as an individuals neighbors
produce more children, the rank of that individual decreases, inciting him/her to produce
more children in order to maintain his/her social rank. This contagious e¤ect of fertility
implies that in polygynous societies, exposure to polygynous men and their large number of
children incites individuals to produce more children than they otherwise would if they had
only monogamous neighbors.
By showing how polygyny might a¤ect individual and aggregate fertility di¤erently, our
analysis o¤ers a simple framework that unies the mixed empirical ndings on this topic. We
also test our model empirically, mainly focusing on its most important and novel predictions.
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1.2 An overview of the empirics
We test the empirical predictions of the model using nationally and sub-nationally represen-
tative household data from Demographic and Health Surveys from 32 sub-Saharan African
countries. These surveys contain information on a wide range of topics including health, fer-
tility, and the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals, households and
neighborhoods.
We rst test the prediction that beautiful women are more likely to enter a polygynous
relationship. The main challenge associated with this test stems from the fact that beauty is
hard to measure, and in fact, several measures of physical attractiveness have been used in
the literature. In general, the appreciation of female attractiveness varies across the world.
Some components of external beauty such as low waist-to-hip ratio (Singh 1995) and clear
complexion (Symons 1979) are agreed upon across most cultures. However, other attributes
such as weight and skin tone vary across cultures and time. In renaissance art, most women
depicted are large with pale skin. Both of those features were contemporary indicators of
wealth and good health. In contrast, most of the women displayed in media as symbols of
beauty today are thin and tall, with tanned skin. Models across the world are much taller
than average and beauty pageants are dominated by tall, thin women. Consistent with these
facts, we nd that the average height of the winners of Miss Universe from 1980-2011 is 1.75
m, and that all the winners are taller than the average woman of their nationality.
It follows that several measures of beauty, including waist-to-hip ratio, skin complexion,
weight, height3, and body mass index (weight in kilograms divided by the square of height
in meters), have been used in the literature. Of these measures, weight, height, and the
BMI are the most popular, perhaps because of their availability in most datasets (e.g., Nettle
2002; Smits 2012; Chiappori, Ore¢ ce, and Quintana-Domeque 2012). The DHS data have
information on these anthropometric indicators. Therefore, we use all the three indicators
to proxy beauty. However, only height appears to produce results that are consistent with
the predictions of our model. The reason seems simple in our context. Owing to the cross-
sectional nature of the DHS, height is more useful than weight and BMI as a predictor of
a possibly past outcome such as marriage, because height is more stable over time after a
certain age than the other measures. Indeed, "current" weight and BMI are not appropriate
measures of "past" beauty because the weight and BMI of a married woman measured at the
survey may be very di¤erent than when she got married, and will therefore fail to explain her
"past" marriage outcome. But such a woman most likely has the same height as when she
got married, and so, "current height" as a measure of beauty can explain her "past" marital
success.
3Height has also been shown to predict social and economic attractiveness, as taller individuals select into
higher-status occupations and earn more than other workers (Case and Paxson 2008; Schultz 2002; Persico,
Postlewaite and Silverman 2004).
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We nd that taller women are more likely to nd a marital partner. They more often marry
polygynous men than monogamous men. These results may have two apparently contradictory
implications for how height a¤ects fertility. The fact that height increases the prospect of
marriage implies that taller women are more likely to have "at least" one child, since marriage
increases the probability of childbearing. However, the fact that taller women are more likely
to enter a polygynous relationship than shorter women does not have a clear theoretical
implication for how beauty a¤ects the number of children. We indeed nd that taller women
are more likely to have a child, but condional on being fecund and on marital status, height
does not a¤ect the number of children. Consistent with theory, height therefore a¤ects female
fertility at the extensive margin, but not at the intensive margin.
We also test the micro-level mechanism through which societal polygyny a¤ects aggregate
fertility. As noted earlier, according to the theory, polygyny prevalence increases aggregate
fertility: (1) by increasing the number of marriages; and (2) by triggering fertility contagion.
We indeed nd that a woman is more likely to get married when polygyny is more prevalent
in her region of residence, validating the rst channel. This nding is robust to alternative
measures of marital success. For instance, societal polygyny reduces the likelihood of divorce
and increases the likelihood of remarriage.
We also validate the second channel, showing that a woman, whether involved in a monog-
amous or a polygynous relationship, has more children as the prevalence of polygyny in her
region of residence increases. Using average height as an instrument for polygyny prevalence,
we nd that a change from a regime of complete monogamy to a regime of complete polygyny
increases the number of children produced by an average woman by about 3.6. Remarkably,
we nd the same estimate when testing the contagious e¤ect of polygyny prevalence over the
sample of only monogamous women.
Our test of the contagious e¤ect of polygyny on individual fertility using the full sample
of women controls for whether a woman is married to a polygynist or not, which allows us
to test the prediction of the model regarding the e¤ect of polygyny on female fertility at the
individual level as well. We nd that a woman involved in a polygynous relationship has fewer
children than a woman involved in a monogamous relationship. This e¤ect is robust to the
inclusion of a range of controls.
It clearly follows from these analyses that, while polygyny prevalence positively a¤ects
individual fertility (regardless of whether a woman is involved in a monogamous or polygynous
relationship), being married to a polygynist negatively a¤ects fertility. However, in absolute
value, the former e¤ect strongly dominates the latter e¤ect, so that the societal practice of
polygyny positively a¤ects individual and aggregate fertility as predicted by the theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the contributions of our study to
the closely related literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model, and Section 4 presents
its testable implications. The model is tested in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Closely related literature
Our paper is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on sexual matching and the
formation of marital relationships. Like our study, most of work in this area assumes that the
matching process is based on one characteristic of socioeconomic or physical attractiveness
(e.g., wages, income, education, height, weight, body mass index) or a set of characteristics
combined into a single objective variable, and so assumes individuals have identical preferences
over the opposite sex (e.g., Becker 1981; Pencavel 1998; Choo and Siow 2006; Chiappori,
Ore¢ ce, and Quintana-Domeque 2012). Our analyses however have signicant di¤erences.
We assume a discrete framework and ordinal preferences such as in Gale and Shapley (1962),
whereas most studies assume matching based on continuous characteristics. We therefore use
di¤erent mathematical tools to identify equilibrium matchings. Also, whereas existing studies
mainly analyze the monogamous marriage market, we also study marriage in a polygynous
culture, uncovering new theoretical results. Moreover, we relax the assumption of homogeneity
in male preferences, allowing female beauty to be judged subjectively by men. Remarkably,
this more general model preserves the uniqueness of the equilibrium matching found in the
more restrictive framework where preferences are dened objectively for both men and women.
Our analysis of matching in a polygynous culture also relates to pioneering works by
Becker (1974, 1981) and Grossbard (1978). These studies analyze the causes of polygyny and
its consequences on economic productivity, household resource allocation, and welfare (see also
Jacoby (1995) and Fenske (2013)). Bergstrom (1994) extends these earlier analyses by incor-
porating the desire of individuals to maximize the number of their children and descendants
when resources are limited.
Our theoretical framework also complements and reconciles apparently mixed empirical
ndings on the relationship between polygyny and fertility. Tertilt (2005) shows that polygyny
a¤ects aggregate fertility by increasing bride price. She argues that competition for wives in
a polygynous society raises bride price; parents therefore have a greater incentive to produce
more children as they receive bride price on behalf of their daughters. At the individual
level, other studies have found a negative relationship between polygyny and female fertility
(e.g., Pebley and Mbugua 1989; Garenne and van de Walle 1989; Timaeus and Reynar 1998;
Muhsam 1956), whereas others have found no relationship (e.g., Busia 1954). Our work
reconciles these earlier studies by providing a unied framework which allows us to analyze the
e¤ect of polygyny and polygyny prevalence on individual and aggregate fertility. We nd that
although polygyny prevalence increases individual and aggregate fertility, being married to a
polygynous man negatively a¤ects individual fertility as long as the preference for reproduction
relative to consumption is not too strong. Further incorporating envy into our model shows
that the societal practice of polygyny triggers fertility contagion, which positively a¤ects the
fertility of even monogamous couples.
We also test the key predictions of our model, therefore contributing to the empirical
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literature on the determinants of fertility. Fertility has been related to mortality (see, e.g.,
Nerlove 1974; Dyson 2010; Kalemli-Ozcan 2002; Doepke 2005; Fernández-Villaverde 2001),
income (Becker 1960; Jones and Tertilt 2006), human capital, and female labor participation
(e.g., Galor and Weil 1996 1999, 2000; Galor and Moav 2002; Murphy 2009; Becker, Murphy
and Tamura 1990; Tamura 1996; De La Croix and Doepke 2003; Doepke 2004). Our estimated
e¤ects of polygyny on fertility are robust to the inclusion of these other determinants of
fertility.
We also view our study as contributing to the theory of endogenous network formation.
The analysis shows an instance in which culture and institution shape the conguration of
networks. In this respect, the ndings complement the study of (in)delity networks (Pongou
2009a; Pongou and Serrano 2009, 2013), and highlight di¤erences in partner sorting across
monogamous and polygynous cultures.
Several studies have examined the characteristics of polygynous men, showing, for instance,
that these men are wealthier or have a higher social status than monogamous men (e.g., Becker
1974). The characteristics of women who enter a polygynous union, however, have not been
widely studied. Our model predicts that more attractive women are more likely to be married
to polygynous men. This mating pattern has implications for how beauty a¤ects fertility at
both the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, the model implies that more beautiful
women are more likely to have at least one child. However, it does not yield an unambiguous
prediction on the relationship between beauty and number of children. We do not know of
any theory with similar predictions. We validate these predictions empirically.
3 A model of polygyny and fertility
Our model assumes that people marry in the rst period and produce children in the second
period. Following this rationale, we develop our theory in two parts. The rst part studies
marriage outcomes in monogamous and polygynous cultures, and the second part studies the
e¤ect of polygyny on individual and aggregate fertility.
3.1 A hierarchical mating economy
Our setting consists of a non-empty nite set of individuals N = fi1; : : : ; ing divided into a
set of men M = fm1; : : : ;mkg and a set of women W = fw1; : : : ; wkg, each of equal size.
Men and women are ranked according to an objective criterion (the ranking criterion may be
wealth for men and education or beauty for women).4 Without loss of generality, we assume
the rank of mi to be higher than that of mi+1 and the rank of wi to be higher than that of
wi+1, i = 1; :::; k   1. Each individual derives utility from having marital relationships with
4The ranking criterion for each side of the economy may also be an objective variable that combines a set
of ordinal or cardinal characteristics.
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the opposite sex, and higher-ranked individuals are more desired as partners. A woman can
have at most one partner, whereas a man can have multiple partners depending on whether
polygyny is allowed or not. Each man desires to match with a nite number of partners. We
further assume that there is a social rank threshold below which a man cannot get married
(in other words, men falling below this threshold are unacceptable as partners, although they
desire to have sex).5 Let M1 represent the set of men who are above this threshold and M2
the set of men below the threshold (M2 may be empty).6 This setting denes what we call a
hierarchical mating economy. This denition is more formally summarized below:
Denition 1 A hierarchical mating economy is a list E = (N = M1[M2[W; (sj)1jn;m
;w) where:
 sj represents the capacity (or number of partners that cannot be exceeded) of individual
ij;
 m and w are linear orderings on M and W representing the rankings of men and
women, respectively. m also represents womens preferences over mens ranks and w
represents mens preferences over womens ranks.
As we mentioned previously, we shall assume that sj = 1 if ij 2 W . Also, on the second
interpretation of mand w, we remark that m is not a ranking of the subsets of the set of
men by women as it is often the case in traditional matching problems; m is a ranking of
individual (or singleton) men by women; similarly, w is a ranking of individual women by
men. For our purpose, we do not need a ranking of the subsets of the set of agents on each
side of the market.
Our goal is to study the equilibrium matching of this economy under two alternative
cultures or institutions, namely a monogamous culture where a man can have at most one
partner, and a polygynous culture where a man may have multiple partners. Equilibrium is
captured by the notion of pairwise stability. According to this notion, a marriage network or
matching g, understood as a collection of links between men and women, is pairwise stable if:
"(i) no individual has an incentive to sever an existing link in which he/she is involved; and
(ii) no male-female pair has an incentive to form a new link while at the same time possibly
severing some of the existing links in which they are involved." We provide a more formal
denition of pairwise stability below.
5This assumption implies that there are more women than men on the marriage market, which has been
oberved in most societies. In certain traditional societies, it is common for 18 year old girls to get married,
whereas men of the same age may not (UNICEF 2005).
6If the set M2 is empty, it means that there are as many men as women on the marriage market. But as
argued above, there are generally more women than men on the marriage market, meaning that M2 is not
empty in general.
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Denition 2 Let (i)i2N be a prole of preferences on the set of all possible matchings, and
g a matching. We say that g is pairwise stable with respect to (i)i2N if:
(i) 8i 2 N , 8(i; j) 2 g, g i g n f(i; j)g.
(ii) 8(i; j) 2 (M W ) n g, if network g0 is obtained from g by adding the link (i; j) and
perhaps severing other links involving i or j, g0 i g =) g j g0 and g0 j g =) g i g0.
The following result says that there is a unique pairwise stable matching in this economy.
It also provides a characterization of this matching in terms of the number of partners that
each individual obtains.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pairwise stable matching in this economy. More precisely:
 Under a monogamous culture, each man mi is matched with woman wi if i  k   jM2j,
and all men mi and women wi such that i > k   jM2j are unmatched.
 Under a polygynous culture, m1 is matched with the rst s1 = min(s1; jW j) highest ranked
women, m2 is matched with the next s2 = min(s2; jW j   s1) highest ranked women, and
so on. Iterating, mi is matched with the next si = min(si ; jW j  
i 1P
j=1
sj) highest ranked
women, i = 2; :::; k   jM2j. And all men mi such that i > k   jM2j and the remaining
women are unmatched.
Proof. The proof is constructive and follows the steps in Pongou (2009a). The unique
pairwise stable matching is constructed as follows. Suppose that men and women are lined up
according to their social rank. Under monogamy, the highest ranked man m1 rst proposes
the highest ranked of his s1 most preferred women, who is w1. The latter accepts since m1
is her most preferred man. Afterwards, both leave the market. Now comes m2s turn, who
proposes to the highest ranked of his s2 most preferred women remaining in the market, who
is w2; the latter accepts, given that m2 is her most preferred man remaining in the market,
both leaving the market afterwards; and so on, until mk jM2j last matches with wk jM2j and
leaves the market. By denition, all men mi such that i > k   jM2j will not match, which
automatically implies that all women wi such that i > k   jM2j will not match either. One
can easily prove that the described matching is the unique pairwise stable matching.
Under polygyny, m1 rst proposes each of his s1 = min(s1; jW j) most preferred women.
The latter accept his proposal given thatm1 is their most preferred man. These newly matched
individuals then leave the market. Afterwards, m2 proposes each of his s2 = min(s2; jW j  s1)
most preferred women remaining in the market. The latter accept his proposal given that m2
is their most preferred man remaining in the market, and these newly matched individuals
leave the market afterwards. It follows by induction that man mi (i = 2; :::; k jM2j) matches
with the next si = min(si ; jW j  
i 1P
j=1
sj) highest ranked women remaining in the market. As
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under monogamy, it is easy to prove that the resulting matching is the unique pairwise stable
matching.
We provide below an illustration of this result.
Example 1 Consider the following hierarchical mating economy with 5 men, m1, m2, m3,
m4 and m5, and 5 women, w1, w2, w3, w4 and w5, where the demand for wives by men is
(s1; s

2; s

3; s

4; s

5) = (2; 2; 1; 1; 1) and M1 = M (each man may marry). Under monogamy,
the unique equilibrium matching, represented by Figure 1, is the one in which each man mi
matches with woman wi. Under polygyny, in the unique equilibrium matching, represented by
Figure 2, m1 is matched with w1 and w2, m2 is matched with w3 and w4, m3 is matched with
w5, and m4 and m5 are unmatched.
Figure 1: Monogamy equilibrium Figure 2: Polygyny equilibrium
Now, suppose that the demand for wives by men is (s1; s

2; s

3; s

4; s

5) = (2; 2; 1; 1; 1) and
M1 = fm1, m2, m3, m4g (m5 cannot marry). Under monogamy, each man mi will with
woman wi if 1  i  4, and m5 and w5 will be unmatched (Figure 3). Under Polygyny, the
unique equilibrium matching will still be the one represented by Figure 2.
Figure 3: Monogamy equilibrium when M2 is nonempty
We note that while the number of marriages is the same under monogamy and polygyny in
the former economy, the situation is quite di¤erent in the latter economy, where the number
of marriages is greater under polygyny than under monogamy. We shall later generalize this
result. We also note that in both economies, the monopolizing power of highest-ranked men
deprives their lowest-ranked counterparts of wives.
A testable implication of Theorem 1 stated in Corollary 1 below is that the aggregate
number of marriages (or nuptiality rate) is higher under a polygynous culture than under a
monogamous culture.
11
Corollary 1 1) The aggregate number of marriages is higher under a polygynous culture than
under a monogamous culture.
2) A womans probability of getting married is greater in a polygynous culture than in a
monogamous culture.
Proof. 1) Under a monogamous culture, the aggregate number of marriages equals the number
of men who may get married, that is jM1j. Under a polygynous culture, each man mi 2 M1
may have at least one wife. So the aggregate demand for women by men who may get married
is at least jM1j. But it follows from the construction of the unique pairwise stable matching
that arises in a polygynous culture in the proof of Theorem 1 that at least jM1j women get
married, which implies that the number of marriages under polygyny is weakly greater than
under monogamy. The inequality is strict if si > 1 for some man mi 2M1.
2) The proof follows from the proof of 1).
Another testable implication of Theorem 1 is that if the maximum number of partners
that a man may have is increasing in his social rank, then higher-ranked women (or more
beautiful women) have greater chance to enter a polygynous relationship, with the number of
co-wives increasing with social rank. This result is summarized in Corollary 2 below.
Corollary 2 If si  sj whenever i < j, and if wi and wj are married, then the number of
wives that wis husband has weakly exceeds the number of wives that wjs husband has. The
last inequality may be strict.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the construction of the pairwise stable matching
in the proof of Theorem 1.
We note that a situation where the number of women that a man may have increases with
his social rank is when social rank is measured by wealth and wealth buys women (maybe in
the form of bride price). Interestingly, Corollary 2 also implies that more beautiful women
are more likely to be cheated upon by their husband. This is because more beautiful women
marry wealthier men, who attract other women.
3.2 Beauty is subjective
We consider a variant of a hierarchical mating economy in which men are ranked the same
way by the women, but each man has his own ranking of women. The motivation here is
that if the desirability of a woman as a partner is based, for instance, on how beautiful she
is, each man may have a di¤erent denition of beauty. For example, if beauty is determined
by height, a man may not want his wife to be much taller than he is. Since men di¤er in
height, they rank women di¤erently. We will call it a hierarchical mating economy when all
the members of a group have identical preferences over the members of the opposite group.
When di¤erentiated preference structures are allowed for members of one group, we will call
it a hierarchical mating economy with one-sided subjective rankings.
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Denition 3 A hierarchical mating economy with one-sided subjective rankings is a list E =
(N = M1 [M2 [W; (sj)1jn;m; (mw )m2M) where:
 sj represents the capacity of individual ij;
 m is a linear ordering onM representing the ranking of men by all women, and mw is a
linear ordering on W representing the ranking of women by man m. m also represents
womens preferences over mens ranks and mw represents man ms preferences over
womens ranks.
As for hierarchical mating economies, we nd that a hierarchical mating economy with one-
sided subjective rankings has a unique pairwise stable matching. We also give a description
of this matching in terms of the number of partners that each individual obtains.
Theorem 2 There exists a unique pairwise stable matching in a hierarchical mating economy
with one-sided subjective rankings. More precisely:
 Under a monogamous culture, m1 is matched with "his" highest ranked woman, each
man mi (i = 2; :::; k   jM2j) is matched with "his" highest ranked woman (not matched
with mj, j = 1; :::; i  1) if i  k  jM2j, and all men mi such that i > k  jM2j and the
remaining women not matched with any man in M1 are unmatched.
 Under a polygynous culture, m1 is matched with "his" s1 = min(s1; jW j) highest ranked
women, m2 is matched with "his" s2 = min(s2; jW j   s1) highest ranked women (not
matched with m1), and so on. Iterating, mi is matched with "his" si = min(si ; jW j  
i 1P
j=1
sj) highest ranked women (not matched with mj, j = 1; :::; i  1), i = 2; :::; k   jM2j.
And all men mi such that i > k   jM2j and the remaining women are unmatched.
Proof. The reasoning is similar to that of Theorem 1 and so, the proof is left to the reader.
We illustrate this result in the following example.
Example 2 Consider the following hierarchical mating economy, analyzed in Example 1, with
5 men, m1, m2, m3, m4 and m5, and 5 women, w1, w2, w3, w4 and w5, where the demand for
wives by men is (s1; s

2; s

3; s

4; s

5) = (2; 2; 1; 1; 1) and M1 = M (each man may marry). The
di¤erence is that each man has his own ranking of women. Those rankings are the following:
m1 : w4  w1  w2  w3  w5 (that is, m1 prefers w4 over w1, w1 over w2, w2 over w3,
and w3 over w5)
m2 : w1  w3  w2  w4  w5
m3 : w1  w4  w5  w3  w2
m4 : w3  w2  w4  w1  w5
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m5 : w2  w1  w3  w4  w5
Under monogamy, the unique equilibrium matching, represented by Figure 4, is the one
in which m1 matches with w4, m2 matches with w1, m3 matches with w5, m4 matches with
w3, and m5 matches with w2. Under polygyny, the unique equilibrium matching, represented
by Figure 5, is the one in which m1 matches with w4 and w1, m2 matches with w3 and w2
(his 2 highest ranked women not matched with m1), m3 matches with w5, and m4 and m5 are
unmatched.
Figure 4: Monogamy equilibrium with one-sided subjective rankings
Figure 5: Polygyny equilibrium with one-sided subjective rankings
We remark that the structure of the pairwise stable matching in terms of the distribution
of links is the same for the rst hierarchical mating economy analyzed in Example 1 and
the hierarchical mating economy with one-sided subjective rankings being studied under either
monogamy (Figure 1 has the same structure as Figure 4) or polygyny (Figure 2 and Figure 5
have the same structure), but the marriages are di¤erent.
As illustrated in Example 2, we note that the unique equilibrium matching which arises
in a hierarchical mating economy with one-sided subjective rankings has the same structure
as the unique equilibrium matching which arises in the corresponding hierarchical mating
economy under either monogamy or polygyny. Both matchings are similar up to permutations
of the women, with men having the exact same number of women. This implies that the
nding stated in Corollary 1, according to which the number of marriages is greater under a
polygynous culture than under a monogamous culture, holds for hierarchical mating economies
with one-sided subjective rankings as well.
3.3 The e¤ect of polygyny on individual-level fertility
In this section, we study the e¤ect of polygyny on fertility at the individual level. We conduct
this analysis under two alternative preference structures. First, we assume that children are
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the only consumption good in the household.7 Under the second structure, parents derive
utility not only from the number of children they have, but from other goods too. Another
salient feature of the second model is that parents have "othersregarding preferences", owing
to the fact that the number of children determines the "prestige rank" of parents, so that
having more children than other parents generate greater utility.
3.3.1 Children as the only good
Assume that a man m has l wives w1; :::; wl. Each individual derives utility from having
children. A child is conceived out of the consent of his two parents, and is raised with resources
contributed by both. For simplicity, we assume that they have identical preferences and
endowment. Denote respectively by u and y each individuals utility function and endowment
(endowment includes all types of resources needed to raise a child such as nancial resources,
time, attention, etc.). We assume that u is twice-continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
concave and increasing in the number of children. Let c be the price of a child, nm the total
number of children born to the man m and all his wives, and ni the number of children born
to wife wi (i = 1; :::; l). It follows that:
nm = n1 + :::+ nl and cnm = y + ly (1)
Given that a child is conceived out of the consent of his two parents, it makes sense to
assume that a man who has several wives decides how many children to give each wife. In
fact, a wife cannot have more children than her husband wants to give her. Conversely, a
husband cannot give any of his wives more children than the number she desires. But within
our framework, we have assumed that man m and each of his wives have identical preferences,
so that no wife desires more children than m. We shall therefore consider a unitary household
model in which all incomes are pooled together and the husband, acting as a social planner,
decides how many children (ni) to give each wife wi. 8 We assume that he allocates children
7This is equivalent to assuming that each parent derives utility from children as well as from other con-
sumption goods, with resources being allocated in a "xed" proportion between children and these other
goods.
8Another way to model the fertility decision of each individual within our context is to assume that the
husband and his wives play a non-cooperative game in which the strategy set of each wife is the set of positive
real numbers R+, and the strategy set of the husband is the l cartesian product of the set of positive real
numbers Rl+ (each wife chooses the number of children she would like to have and the husband chooses the
number of children he would like to have with each wife; and assuming wife i wants to have xi children and the
husband wants to have xi children with her, then i will have ni = min(xi; xi) children as the consent of both
the husband and the wife is necessary for a child to be conceived). If we assume that the husband is equally
altruistic to his wives in that he cares not only about his own payo¤, but also about the payo¤s of his wives,
we can show that the solution of the social planner problem as we model it in this paper is a Nash equilibrium
of the fertility game we just dened. In addition, that Nash equilibrium can be shown to be e¢ cient. It follows
that our social planner model is a realistic model of fertility decisions within our framework.
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across his wives so as to maximize a social welfare function such as the following:
U(nm; n1; :::; nl) = u(nm) + u(n1) + :::+ u(nl)
9 (2)
His maximization problem can be formulated as follows:
Maximize U(nm; n1; :::; nl) = u(nm) + u(n1) + :::+ u(nl)
subject to nm = n1 + :::+ nl; (3)
cnm = y + ly;
ni  0; i = 1; :::; l
It is easy to see that the solution of (3) is the egalitarian solution ni = n

w =
y
lc
+ y
c
for
all i = 1; :::; l and nm =
y+ly
c
.10 Interestingly, we note that the functional form of nw shows
that each woman receives the number of children corresponding to her own endowment plus
her husbands endowment shared equally across all wives. These results lead to the following
testable implications, which say that the number of children that a man has increases with
the number of wives he has, but the number of children that each wife has decreases with the
number of co-wives.
Proposition 1 nm is strictly increasing in l and n

w is strictly decreasing in l.
Proof. The proof comes from the expression of nm and n

w above.
We note that Proposition 1 implies that a woman in a monogamous relationship has more
children than a woman in a polygynous relationship. However, a man in a monogamous
relationship has less children than a man in a polygynous relationship.
3.3.2 Envy or children as a signal of prestige
We now introduce envy or "othersregarding preferences" in the model. This may arise in a
context in which the number of children is a source of prestige to their parents, so that having
more children than other parents in the society generates more utility. More formally, if we
9Note that our social welfare function is slightly di¤erent from traditional social welfare functions which
do not incorporate the social planners utility. In this respect, our social planner is not entirely "benevolent".
10The egalitarian solution arises because we assume that the husband marries all his wives simultaneously,
or that the order in each he marries his wives is random. We could have assumed a sequential model in which
the husband marries his wives in a xed order as follows: he marries woman 1 in the rst period, woman 2 in
the second period, and so on, until he marries all his l wives. In each period t, the husband solves problem (3),
maximizing the social welfare function U(nm; n1; :::; nt) = u(nm) + u(n1) + ::: + u(nt) under the assumption
that his endowment y is equally split across the l periods in which he marries. The number of children that
each wife produces after the l periods is the sum of children produced since marrying the husband. Solving this
problem shows that higher-order wives will have more children, but the number of children that the husband
will have will not di¤er from the number of children produced under the assumption that he marries his wives
simultaneously. It follows that the relationship between polygyny and the "average" number of children for
each woman is the same whether we assume a simultaneous model or a sequential model.
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let nij be the number of children born to an individual ij 2 N , and n m be the total number
of children born to his/her neighbor, then the individuals utility is increasing in nij   n m
where  > 0 is the degree to which he/she envies his/her neighbor. In particular, if  tends
to 0, there is little envy, a situation similar to our assumption in Section 3.3.1. We shall also
assume that each individual derives utility from other consumption goods that we summarize
into a single variable x 2 R+. It follows that each individuals utility function is dened
over the collection of bundles (nij   n m; x). For simplicity, we shall assume such a utility
function to be additively separable, so that it can be written as:
u(nij   n m) + v(x) (4)
where each of the functions u and v is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, strictly concave
and increasing.
Following the same argument developed in the model without envy, we shall consider
a unitary household model again where the husband, acting as a social planner, allocates
children across his wives and the x good across his wives and himself. If we let p be the price
of the x good, his maximization problem will now be:
Maximize U(nm; n1; :::; nl; xm; x1; :::; xl) = u(nm   n m) + v(xm) + u(n1   n m)
+v(x1) + :::+ u(nl   n m) + v(xl)
subject to nm = n1 + :::+ nl; (5)
cnm + p(xm + x1 + :::+ xl) = y + ly;
ni  0; i = 1; :::; l;
xm  0; xi  0; i = 1; :::; l
The following claims will be useful in the analysis of this maximization problem.
Claim 1 U attains a maximum in the constraint set.
Proof. It follows from the constraints that each ni 2 [0; y+lyc ] and each xi 2 [0; y+lyp ], i =
m; 1; 2; :::; l. The constraint set therefore is C = [0; y+ly
c
]l+1 [0; y+ly
p
]l+1, which is a closed and
bounded subset of R2(l+1). Hence, it follows from the Heine-Borel Theorem that C is compact.
Given that U is a real-valued continuous function dened on a compact set, we conclude by the
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem on the existence of extreme value that U attains a maximum
in C.
Claim 2 Let f be a real-valued continuous function dened on a bounded interval I  R. If f
is strictly concave and increasing, then the function dened by g(x1; :::; xn) = f(x1)+:::+f(xn)
attains a unique maximum (x1; :::; x

n) in I
n (n > 1). Furthermore, x1 = x

2 = ::: = x

n.
17
Proof. The proof is left to the reader.
Given that U is additively separable, following Bergstrom (2011), (4) can be split up into
the following maximization problems:
Maximize u(nm   n m)
subject to cnm = y1 (6)
and
Maximize u(n1   n m) + :::+ u(nl   n m)
subject to nm = n1 + :::+ nl; (7)
ni  0; i = 1; :::; l
and
Maximize v(xm) + v(x1) + :::+ v(xl)
subject to p(xm + x1 + :::+ xl) = y2; (8)
xm  0; xi  0; i = 1; :::; l
where y1 + y2 = y + ly. Here, income is spent on children (y1) and other consumption
goods (y2). But unlike in Section 3.3.1, the allocation of income between these two types of
goods is not xed.
The solution of (6) is nm =
y1
c
. It follows from Claim 2 that the solution of (7) is (n1; :::; n

l )
such that n1 = n

2 = ::: = n

l =
nm
l
, and the solution of (8) is (xm; x

1; :::; x

l ) such that
xm = x

1 = ::: = x

l
Since the egalitarian solution arises in equilibrium, suppose ni = nw (i = 1; :::; l), and
xi = x (i = m; 1; :::; l). Our maximization problem then becomes:
Maximize U(nw; x) = u(lnw   n m) + lu(nw   n m) + (l + 1)v(x)
subject to clnw + p(l + 1)x = y + ly (9)
nw  0
x  0
Claim 1 and Claim 2 ensure that a unique equilibrium exists. We distinguish three cases:
(a) nw = 0; (b) x = 0; (c) nw > 0 and x > 0.
If nw = 0, then x =
y+ly
p(l+1)
. If x = 0, then nw =
y+ly
cl
, which corresponds to the previously
analyzed situation in which children were the only good.
If nw > 0 and x > 0, then from the equality constraint, we deduce x =
y+ly clnw
p(l+1)
, which
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implies that the social planners problem will simply consist of maximizing:
U(nw) = u(lnw   n m) + lu(nw   n m) + (l + 1)v(y + ly   clnw
p(l + 1)
) (10)
or equivalently
U(nm) = u(nm   n m) + lu(nm
l
  n m) + (l + 1)v(y + ly   cnm
p(l + 1)
) (11)
Both functions will be useful for the comparative statics analysis. The rst order conditions
for these two functions are respectively:
U 0(nw) = lu0(lnw   n m) + lu0(nw   n m)  cl
p
v0(
y + ly   clnw
p(l + 1)
) = 0 (12)
and
U 0(nm) = u0(nm   n m) + u0(nm
l
  n m)  c
p
v0(
y + ly   cnm
p(l + 1)
) = 0 (13)
We derive testable implications. First, the number of children that a man has increases
with the number of his wives, but the number of children that each wife has increases or
decreases with the number of wives depending on the utility function.
Proposition 2 nm is strictly increasing in l. n

w may be strictly increasing or decreasing in
l depending on the utility function.
Proof. 1) We want to show that at nm = nm,
@nm
@l
> 0. First compute @nm
@l
by applying the
Implicit Function Theorem to (13). Write:
U 0(nm) = u0(nm   n m) + u0(nml   n m)  cpv0(y+ly cnmp(l+1) ) = f(nm; l; n m).
We have:
@nm
@l
=  @f(nm;l;n m)
@l
(@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
) 1.
The reader can check that:
 @f(nm;l;n m)
@l
=  ( nm
l2
u00(nm
l
  n m)  c2nmv00( (l+1)y cnmp(l+1) )).
It follows that  @f(nm;l;n m)
@l
< 0 given that u00 < 0 and v00 < 0 by assumption.
Also, we have:
@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
= u00(nm   n m) + 1l u00(nml   n m) + c
2
p2(l+1)
v00( (l+1)y cnm
p(l+1)
) < 0.
This implies that (@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
) 1 < 0. Since @nm
@l
is the product of two negative numbers,
it is positive.
2) Let us prove that at nw = nw, the sign of
@nw
@l
is ambiguous. Compute @nw
@l
by applying
the Implicit Function Theorem to (12). Write:
U 0(nw) = lu0(lnw   n m) + lu0(nw   n m)  clp v0(y+ly clnwp(l+1) ) = g(nw; l; n m).
We have:
@nw
@l
=  @g(nw;l;n m)
@l
 (@g(nw;l;n m)
@nw
) 1.
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The reader can check that:
 @g(nw;l;n m)
@l
=  (lnwu00(lnw n m)+u0(lnw n m)+u0(nw n m)  cpv0( (l+1)y clnwp(l+1) )
  c2lnw
p2(l+1)2
v00( (l+1)y clnw
p(l+1)
)).
Given that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, the sign of  @g(nw;l;n m)
@l
is clearly ambiguous. It could be
positive or negative. However, we have the following:
@g(nw;l;n m)
@nw
= (l2u00(lnw n m) + lu00(nw n m) + clp2(l+1)v00( (l+1)y clnwp(l+1) ) < 0.
So if  @g(nw;l;n m)
@l
> 0, then @nw
@l
< 0, and if  @g(nw;l;n m)
@l
< 0, then @nw
@l
> 0.
We also analyze the impact of a neighbors fertility on an individuals own fertility. We
nd that an individuals number of children is positively a¤ected by the number of children
his neighbor has, which is a contagion e¤ect of fertility.
Proposition 3 nm is strictly increasing in n m.
Proof. It su¢ ces to prove that @n

m
@n m > 0. First write Equation (13) as:
U 0(nm) = u0(nm   n m) + u0(nml   n m)  cpv0(y+ly cnmp(l+1) ) = f(nm; l; n m).
Apply to this equation the Implicit Function Theorem. We have:
@nm
@n m =  
@f(nm;l;n m)
@n m  (
@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
) 1.
The reader can check that:
 @f(nm;l;n m)
@n m =  [( u00(nm   n m)  u00(nml   n m)] < 0.
Also, we have:
@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
= u00(nm n m) + 1l u00(nml  n m) + c
2
p2(l+1)
v00( (l+1)y cnm
p(l+1)
) < 0.
It follows that (@f(nm;l;n m)
@nm
) 1 < 0. We conclude that @nm
@n m > 0, which holds at nm = n

m.
Not surprisingly, we note from the expression of  @f(nm;l;n m)
@n m in the proof that as the
degree of envy () tends to 0, the marginal e¤ect of an individuals neighbor fertility on his
own fertility tends to 0 as well. So fertility is only as contagious as envy is strong.
As a corollary of Proposition 3, a monogamous individual in a functioning polygynous
culture has more children than a monogamous individual in a monogamous culture.
Corollary 3 Any individual, regardless of whether he/she is involved in a monogamous or a
polygynous relationship, has more children if he/she lives in a functioning polygynous culture
than if he/she lives in a monogamous culture.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that in a functioning polygynous culture, there is at
least one man who has several wives, and who by Proposition 2 has more children than he
would have had in a monogamous culture. An individual in a polygynous culture is therefore
exposed to the fertility behavior of such a polygynist, which by Proposition 3 has a positive
e¤ect on his/her own fertility.
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3.4 Aggregate fertility in a polygynous versus a monogamous cul-
ture
In this section, we investigate the e¤ect of matrimonial culture on the total number of children
in a society. Our analysis draws on the ndings of the previous sections. We will distinguish
two situations, namely one in which the number of children that a woman has decreases
with the number of wives her husband has, and one in which the opposite holds. From the
analysis conducted in previous sections, we know that the rst situation occurs when children
are the only consumption good, or under certain conditions, when children bring prestige to
their parents. We will see that in such a situation, the e¤ect of a polygynous culture on the
aggregate number of children is ambiguous.
Let (si )i2M be the demand for women by the men in a hierarchical mating economy. We
know that M = M1 [M2 and si = 0 if i 2M2. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume that @n

w
@l
< 0.
1) If
P
i2M1
si < jW j, then the total number of children is greater in a polygynous culture
than in a monogamous culture. The inequality is strict if si > 1 for some man mi 2M1.
2) If
P
i2M1
si  jW j, then the total number of children may be lower in a polygynous culture
than in a monogamous culture.
Proof. 1) If
P
i2M1
si < jW j, meaning that the aggregate demand for women by the men who
may get married is smaller than the total number of women, then obviously, each man in M1
will obtain his optimal number of women in the unique equilibrium that exists in the economy.
Since each man in M1 has at least one woman, by Propositions 1 and 2, each such man will
have at least the number of children he would have had in a monogamous culture, implying
that the total number of children is greater in a polygynous than in a monogamous culture.
Assume that si > 1 for some man mi 2M1. By Propositions 1 and 2, given that mi has more
than one wife, he will have strictly more children than he would have had in a monogamous
culture, which implies strict inequality when we compare the aggregate number of children
under the two regimes.
2) If
P
i2M1
si  jW j, all women will get married in a polygynous culture, but some men in
M1 may remain unmatched. Let us show by a simple example that the total number of children
may be lower in a polygynous culture than in a monogamous culture. Consider a hierarchical
mating economy that has 4 men m1, m2, m3, and m4 and 4 women w1, w2, w3, and w4, where
(s1; s

2; s

3; s

4) = (2; 2; 1; 1) and M1 = M (each man may marry). Suppose that preferences
for the number of children are such that a monogamous man gets 3 children and a man who
has two wives gets 4 children, with each wife having 2 children (note that this assumption is
consistent with @n

m
@l
< 0). Under monogamy, the unique equilibrium matching is the one in
which each man mi matches with woman wi. In this case, each couple has 3 children, and
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thus the total number of children is 12. Under polygyny, the unique equilibrium matching is
one in which m1 is matched with w1 and w2, m2 is matched with w3 and w4, and m3 and m4
are unmatched. In this case, m1 and m2 will have 4 children each, and m3 and m4 will have
no children, yielding a total of 8 children. We conclude that in this particular example, the
total number of children is smaller under polygyny than under monogamy, despite the fact
that a polygynist has strictly more children than a monogamist at the individual level. Note,
however, that if (s1; s

2; s

3; s

4) were (2; 1; 1; 0), the other assumptions remaining unchanged,
the total number of children would have been 10 under polygyny and 9 under monogamy, and
the conclusion therefore would have been di¤erent.
We note that the condition under which polygyny positively a¤ects aggregate fertility is
more likely to be empirically valid, as there exist single women even when polygyny is allowed.
In the second situation where the number of children that a woman has increases with the
number of wives her husband has, we nd that the total number of children is greater in a
polygynous culture than in a monogamous culture.
Proposition 5 Assume that @n

w
@l
> 0. Then, the total number of children is greater in a
polygynous culture than in a monogamous culture. The inequality is strict if si > 1 for some
man mi 2M1.
Proof. By Corollary 1, we know that the number of women who get married is greater in a
polygynous than in a monogamous culture. Since @n

w
@l
> 0 by assumption, under polygyny,
each such woman has at least the number of children she would have got under monogamy,
which implies that the total number of children is greater in a polygynous than in a monoga-
mous culture. If one such woman shares her husband with at least one woman (that is, si > 1
for some man mi 2M1), by the assumption that @nw@l > 0, she will have strictly more children
than she would have had in a monogamous culture, which yields the strict inequality.
4 Testable and tested predictions
The model developed in the preceding sections has yielded a rich set of testable predictions
that we summarize below:
1. Beautiful women are more likely to be married (this follows from Theorem 1).
2. Beautiful women are more likely to be married to polygynous men, or to be cheated if
polygyny is not allowed (Corollary 2).
3. Beautiful women are more likely to have at least one childthe extensive margin(this
follows immediately from the fact that (a) female beauty increases marital success as
implied by Theorem 1, and (b) the demand from children is greater within marriage).
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4. Beauty has no clear e¤ect on the number of children produced by a womanthe intensive
marginas female beauty increases the likelihood of marrying a polygynist, but being
married to a polygynist has an ambiguous e¤ect on the number of children produced
(see prediction 8 below).
5. Higher-status men are more likely to be polygynous (Theorem 1, Theorem 2).
6. Polygyny prevalence increases the likelihood of marriage for women (Corollary 1).
7. A polygynous man has more children than a monogamous man (Proposition 1, Propo-
sition 2).
8. Being married to a polygynous man has an ambiguous e¤ect on the number of children
produced by a woman: the e¤ect may be negative or positive, or there might be no e¤ect
(Proposition 2).
9. Women, regardless of whether they are involved in a monogamous or polygynous rela-
tionship, have more children as the prevalence of polygyny in their region of residence
increases, which is the contagious e¤ect of polygyny on fertility (Corollary 3).
10. Polygyny prevalence has a positive e¤ect on aggregate fertility (Proposition 4, Proposi-
tion 5). According to proposition 4, the e¤ect may be negative if the aggregate demand
for women is greater than the supply of women, something that is usually not observed
in reality.
Our testable predictions can be divided into two sets. The rst set ((1)-(5)) reveals the
e¤ect of female and male characteristics such as beauty and wealth on marital and reproductive
outcomes. The second set ((6)-(10)) reveals the multi-faceted e¤ects of polygyny and polygyny
prevalence on individual and aggregate fertility.
Clearly, these predictions are too many to be rigorously tested in only one paper. We
therefore only focus our e¤orts on a limited number of predictions, which are those that have
not been su¢ ciently tested in the literature. Also, because of data limitations, we will only
be able to perform a descriptive analysis for most of the tested predictions, showing only cor-
relations. In the rst part of the empirical section, we will test the e¤ect of female beauty on
marital and reproductive outcomes ((1)-(4)). The second part will test the micro-level mech-
anism through which polygyny prevalence positively a¤ects aggregate fertility. According to
the theory, polygyny prevalence increases aggregate fertility throught two main channels: (1)
by increasing the number of marriages (prediction 6); and (2) by trigerring fertility contagion
(prediction 9). Because our study is the rst to theoretically document this second channel
through which polygyny prevalence a¤ects fertility, we will also try to empirically establish its
causality. All these tests will be carried out using household data from multiple sub-Saharan
African countries.
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5 Empirical test of the model
5.1 Data
The data is taken from the DHS surveys and covers 32 countries from sub-Saharan Africa.11
As marriage and fertility outcomes both vary with time and age, we use several waves of
surveys for each country whenever possible (see Appendix Table A) to disentangle those two
dimensions.12
Polygyny is only illegal in six countries13. But legal changes in polygyny regulations can
hardly be considered as exogenous events. They tend to follow the evolutions of customs rather
than the contrary. Indeed several countries encountered severe di¢ culties in passing laws to
ban polygyny (for instance, Uganda) or in enforcing them (Senegal).14 Moreover, polygyny
is common, although less widespread, in countries where it is unlawful, such as Burundi or
Madagascar.
Table 1 presents average statistics over countries in our sample. First, at around three
children born per woman, ranging from 3.9 in Niger to 1.9 in South Africa, average fertility
remains high throughout the continent.
The percentage of women involved in a relationship, either through a legal union or an
informal cohabition, is also rather elevated, ranging from 38% in Namibia to 86% in Niger.
Polygyny appears to be very frequent, and is more widespread in western Africa than
elsewhere on the continent. 43% and 45% of women in Senegal and Benin respectively, are
married to polygynous men, versus less than 20% in Eastern Africa.
Interestingly, the desire for children is acknowledged to be very high, with many women
still giving unrealistic answers to the question regarding the ideal number of children they
would like to have. On average, women declare wanting more than seven children, but this
number even exceeds ten in six countries. In spite of a declining fertility, preferences for
children remain strong.
11The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) used in this study were carried out by : the Statistical and
Health Services (Ghana), the Institut National de la Statistique (Cote dIvoire), the Institut National de la
Statistique (Benin), the Ministère du Plan et de lAménagement du Territoire (Cameroon, 1991), the Bureau
Central des Recensements et Etudes de Population (Cameroon, 1998), the Institut National de la Statistique
(Cameroon, 2004), the Centre National de Recherches sur lEnvironment (Madagascar, 1992), the Institut
National de la Statistique (Madagscar, 1997, 2003, 2008), the National Statistical O¢ ce (Malawi), the Federal
O¢ ce of Statistics (Nigeria, 1990), the National Population Commission (Nigeria, 1999, 2003, 2008), the O¢ ce
National de la Population (Rwanda, 1992, 2000), the Ministry of Economics (Rwanda, 2005), the Ministère
des Finances (Senegal, 1992, 1997), the SERDHA (Senegal, 1999), the Ministère de la Santé, CRDH (Senegal,
2005, 2006), the National Bureau of Statistics (Tanzania), the Bureau of Statistics (Uganda) and the Central
Statistical O¢ ce (Zimbabwe).
12There are 25 countries with more than one survey available and 19 with at least three surveys.
13See annex A for details.
14In Senegal, as in many other countries, men are supposed to choose a polygynous or monogamous
status when they marry for the rst time. However, it is common for men who opted for monogamy during
their youth to later marry a second wife. This law is di¢ cult to enforce as the rst spouse may have to choose
between polygyny and a divorce.
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Female education is low, as many women surveyed between the ages of 15 and 49 did not
benet from the push toward universal primary education of the early 2000s. Average years of
schooling exceeds six years in only six out of 32 countries. Finally, infant mortality rates are
still very high, ranging from 37 per thousand in Zimbabwe to 85 per thousand in Mozambique.
[Table 1]
5.2 Beauty, marriage, polygyny, and fertility
We test the propositions that more beautiful women are more likely: (i) to be married (pre-
diction 1); (ii) to be married to polygynists (prediction 2); and (iii) to have at least to have
at least one child (prediction 3). We also test the e¤ect of beauty on number of children
conditional on fecundity (prediction 4). Prior to testing these relationships, it is appropriate
to discuss how beauty is measured.
5.2.1 Measuring beauty
The physical attractiveness of women is an important factor in determining their desirability as
partners. As explained by Pawlowski (2003), sexual selection is a well established evolutionary
process based on preferences for specic traits in one sex by members of the other sex. It is
important in the evolution of morphological traits, and several sexually dimorphic traits in
humans, such as facial hair and facial shape. In general, however, the appreciation of beauty
varies across the world. Some components of external beauty such as low waist-to-hip ratio
(Singh, 1995) and clear complexion (Symons, 1979) are agreed upon across most cultures.
However, other attributes such as weight and skin tone vary across cultures and time frames.
In renaissance art, most women are depicted as large women with pale skin. Both of those
features were indicators of wealth and good health. In contrast, most of the women displayed
in media as symbols of beauty today are thin and have tanned skin.
In present day "media", height and thinness are the standard for beauty. Models across
the world are much taller than average. While walking the runway, heights are exaggerated
even further with high heels. Most mannequins displaying womens attire in stores tower over
customers and beauty pageants are dominated by tall and thin women. One of the biggest
international beauty contests is Miss Universe, where beauty contest winners from several
countries compete for the international title. We calculate that the average height of the
titleholders from 1980-2011 is 1.75 m, and nd that all the winners are taller than the average
women of their nationality (see Figure 6 for selected countries). As people are widely exposed
to and inuenced by media today, taller women are regarded as more beautiful and in turn
more desirable.
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Figure 6: Winners of Miss Universe are taller than the average women
It follows that several measures of beauty, including waist-to-hip ratio, skin complexion,
height, weight, body mass index (calculated as weight in kilograms divided by the square of
height in meters), have been used in the literature.15 Of these measures, height, weight and
the BMI are the most popular, perhaps because of their availability in most datasets (e.g.,
Chiappori, Ore¢ ce, and Quintana-Domeque 2012). The DHS data used for our analysis have
information on these anthropometric indicators. Therefore, we use all the three indicators as
proxies for beauty. However, only height appears to produce results that are consistent with
our model. In fact, due to the cross-sectional nature of the DHS datasets, height is a more
appropriate, although imperfect, measure of physical attractiveness because it is more stable
over time than weight and BMI after a certain age. Indeed, since our goal is partly to study
the e¤ect of beauty on marriage outcomes, weight and BMI measured at the survey are not
appropriate measures of beauty because the weight and BMI of a woman who is married at
the survey may be very di¤erent than when she got married, and will therefore fail to explain
her "past" marriage outcome. But such a woman most likely has the same height as when she
got married, and so, "current" height as a measure of beauty can explain her "past" marriage
outcome. The other advantage of using height is that it is determined by genetic, feotal and
early childhood conditions (Martorell and Habicht 1986; Schultz 2002; Eveleth and Tanner
1976), and so should largely be viewed as preceding or being exogenous to the marital and
reproductive outcomes we want to predict.
5.2.2 The empirical test
The value of height translates into marital success. Table 2 shows that taller women are
more likely to be married (Column (I)). They are also more likely to marry polygynous men
(Column (II)). These ndings conrm that female height is valued by men.
15Importantly, the multiplicity of measures seems to indicate that there is no perfect measure for beauty.
As our theoretical analysis acknowledges, the appreciation of beauty might also be subjective.
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With respect to fertility, taller women are more likely to have at least one child (Column
(III)); but conditional on being fecund, taller women do not have more children than shorter
women (Column (IV)).
These e¤ects are robust to the control of age, year of survey, place of residence, education,
religion, and country xed-e¤ects.
Some of our ndings complement other studies that have found a positive relationship
between stature and reproductive success (Nettle (2002) , Powlowski (2003)). Also, Smits
(2012) nds a positive correlation between womens height and marital success. This study
shows that taller than average women in India are more likely to marry, get higher educated
husbands with better jobs and are less likely to marry at a very young age or to lose their
husbands through divorce or premature death.
[Table 2]
5.3 Polygyny prevalence and aggregate fertility: The micro-level
mechanism
In this section, we test the micro-level mechanism through which polygyny prevalence a¤ects
aggregate fertility, as implied by prediction 10. As shown by Figure 7, regional polygyny
prevalence positively a¤ects the average number of children, consistent with Propositions 4
and 5.
Figure 7: Partial correlation between regional polygyny prevalence and fertility
According to our theoretical model, polygyny prevalence positively a¤ects aggregate fer-
tility through two channels: (1) by increasing the number of marriages; and (2) by triggering
fertility contagion. We will test of these channels, while insisting on the second one because
of its novelty, as noted earlier.
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5.3.1 E¤ects of polygyny prevalence on marriage
We test the proposition that the practice of polygyny increases the likelihood of a woman
getting married (prediction 6). We perform this test using a probit model, following equation
(14). Countries in the DHS are divided into regions, indexed by j. Our pooled sample
has 324 regions and gathers women who were born between 1941 and 1996. As marriage
outcomes might have changed over time, generational e¤ects must be disentangled from other
social e¤ects. To do so, we split the sample by year of birth into ve categories: 1940-1963,
1964-1971, 1972-1977, 1978-1983, 1984-1996. The cut o¤ years have been chosen to obtain
sub-samples of similar size. By crossing regions j and generations k, one obtains 1,274 di¤erent
strata from which meaningful averages can be computed, such as, for instance, the prevalence
of polygyny. The average number of individuals belonging to a generation k and living in the
region j is about 800, which is su¢ cient to ensure that average statistics are representative
at this level. Breaking up regional averages by generation is necessary as marriage choices
are likely to be inuenced by neighboring women of similar age. Importantly, regressions
estimated by using variables averaged across regions and years of the survey give similar
results.
We assume that the probability of marriage mi for a woman i depends on a vector of indi-
vidual characteristics X i, region/cohort characteristics Y j;k, and the region/cohort prevalence
of polygyny pj;k. Controls include age, fecundity, religion, height, a year trend, and average
level of education, which may capture the fact that women are more free to refuse (early)
marriage in a society where they are collectively empowered by education.
mi = 
 
X im + p
j;kn + Y
j;km

(14)
Results are reported in Table 3, columns (I) to (III). We note that women are more likely
to be involved in a union in areas where polygyny is more frequent. Moreover the e¤ect of
polygyny is very signicant.
The analysis is robust to alternative measures of marital outcomes. Columns (IV) to (VI)
show that polygyny prevalence decreases the probability of divorce and the probability of
remaining single after having been formerly married. It therefore appears that the practice
of polygyny stabilizes marriage and signicantly increases the probability of remarriage after
the loss of a husband.
[Table 3]
5.3.2 The e¤ect of polygyny on individual-level female fertility
In this section, we test the e¤ects of being married to a polygynist on the number of chil-
dren produced by a woman (prediction 8). The test is performed by restricting the sample
to women currently involved in a relationship. We control for several potential confounding
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variables including the overall duration of marriage, whether a woman was married more than
once, whether or not she is fecund, religion, country and urban/rural place of residence. We
also control for the projected infant mortality rate at the individual level. This is because the
infant mortality rate (the number of child deaths before one year of age per 1000 births) is hy-
pothesized to increase fertility as parents produce more children in order to insure themselves
against the loss of a baby.16
We use OLS regressions to estimate the e¤ect of being married to a polygynist on the
number of children (equation 15). In equation 15, ni;j;km denotes the number of children born
to a married woman i, who has characteristics X i, belongs to generation k, and resides in
country/region j; pi is a binary indicator for whether woman i is married to a polygynous
man, and at a yearly trend:
ni;j;k = pi +X i + at + cj;k + "i (15)
Estimations results are reported in Table 4 :
[Table 4]
We nd that the e¤ect of being married to a polygynist on number of children varies null to
negative depending on the controls (columns (IV)-(VI)). In particular, it becomes signicantly
negative once the duration of marriage and country xed e¤ects are controlled for (column
(IV)). This correlation is very robust to the inclusion of other controls such individual child
mortality (column (V)) or region and year xed e¤ects (column (VI)). Although the estimates
are not shown, the duration of the union is found to increase fertility, while women who
married more than once have on average about 0.6 children less. The average infant mortality
in the region increases fertility in all specications. Furthermore, the Bayesian estimate of the
probability of infant death at the individual level is also positively correlated with fertility.
The negative impact of polygyny on female fertility suggests that the taste for reproduction
versus consumption is not too strong in sub-Saharan Africa.
16In our sample, the infant mortality rate is very high, reaching 73.8 per thousand in Malawi and 69.3 per
thousand in Tanzania. However, infant mortality is likely to also depend on individual factors. An obvious
measure of infant mortality the actual rate of infant death among the children of the women whose fertility
we try to study. However, such a measure is strongly endogenous. Because the number of children born is
a discrete variable and is small, the actual mortality rate is a very uncertain measure (especially for women
without children or with a small number of children) of the theoretical probability of death of a womans young
children. We use a Bayesian method to build individual mortality rate (see the appendix for details). The
modeling relies on the assumption that the probability of death of a child does not depend on her rank in the
family.
29
5.3.3 Fertility contagion: The e¤ect of polygyny prevalence on individual-level
fertility
In this section, we test the prediction fertility is contagious. More precisely, we show that
women, regardless of whether they are involved in a monogamous or a polygynous marriage,
have more children as the prevalence of polygyny in their region of residence increases (pre-
diction 9).
A preliminary analysis We estimate the following model:
ni;j;k = pi +X i + pj;k + Y j;k + at + "i (16)
The variables pi, X i, pj;k and Y j;k are interpreted as in the previous equations. Our main
parameter of interest is , which measures the e¤ect of region/cohort polygyny prevalence on
individual-level fertility. We estimate Equation (16) using OLS. Results are reported in Table
5:
[Table 5]
A woman produces more children if polygyny is more prevalent in her region of residence
and cohort. The e¤ect is high and statistically signicant for all women (Column I), including
those involved in a monogamous union (Columns III). Controlling for all other variables, a
woman in a monogamous union produces 0.68 more children if she lives in a highly polygynous
society than if she lives in a monogamous society.
Clearly, our estimate of the e¤ect of polygyny prevalence on the number of children pro-
duced by a woman is likely to su¤er from issues of endogeneity. A key confounding factor is
health, which might determine both the level of polygyny and fertility. We therefore control
for several measures of female health at the region/cohort level. More precisely, we control
for child mortality rate and the female adult survival rate at the regional level.17 The adult
mortality rate has a negative impact on fertility, because women dying prematurely have
less time available to bear children, but this impact is never statistically signicant. On the
contrary, children mortality rate has a positive impact on fertility, as households ensure them-
selves against the loss of children by producing more children. Therefore, introducing the
adult mortality rate allows us to capture not only the general sanitary conditions (which are
already embedded into the regional childrens mortality rate), but also features of the health
and social systems which directly a¤ect womens health.
Second, we control for the average share of women declared infecund at the regional level.
This captures other local or contextual particularities (such as genetics, pollution and health
systems) that may a¤ect conditions in which reproduction and pregnancies take place. The
17This statistics is computed as the percentage of respondents sibling who were alive at the time of interview,
after controlling for the siblingsage and age squared and the year of interview using a probit model.
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share of infecund women has a strong negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the number
of children born.
Third, we compute the share of women aged 18-49 at the regional level who are neither
pregnant nor with an infant and whose last periods occurred more than three months ago.
This indicator captures fertility issues linked to genetic or chronic diseases and malnutrition.
It has a strong a signicant negative impact on fertility.
Overall, the positive correlation between polygyny prevalence and number of children is
highly robust to the inclusion of a wide range of pertinent health indicators. As a consequence,
this correlation is unlikely to be due to underlying connections between health status, fertility
and polygyny.
Interestingly, we also control for the e¤ect of being married to a polygynist, nding that
women married to polygynists tend to have less children than those involved in a monogamous
relationship. The coe¢ cient (-0.10) is remarkably close to previous estimates in Table 4.
We therefore conclude that while being married to a polygynist has a negative e¤ect on
female fertility (which is consistent with Proposition 1), living in a region with a high a
prevalence of polygyny positively a¤ects fertility, our contagious e¤ect (Corollary 3). We note
that being married to a polygynist is a "choice variable", whereas polygyny prevalence is
not (an individual does not choose whether his/her neighbor gets involved in a polygynous
relationship). It follows that polygyny prevalence is a more exogenous variable than the choice
to marry a polygynist, which suggests that the e¤ect of the former variable is more likely to
be causal. What makes our inference of causality from the e¤ect of polygyny prevalence on
individual-level female fertility even more convincing is the fact that polygyny prevalence also
positively a¤ects the fertility of women involved in a monogamous relationship. Polygyny
prevalence is clearly exogenous for these women since they obviously do not contribute to it.
Instrumental variable In this section, we strengthen our claim of a causal e¤ect of polyg-
yny prevalence on individual-level fertility by using an instrumental variable suggested by our
theoretical model. According to the theory, female beauty increases the likelihood of entering
into a polygynous union but does not have a clear impact on the number of children. In
Section 4.2, we validated these predictions by showing that taller women are more likely to be
married to polygynous men. But conditional on being fecund, they do not have more children
than shorter women. These ndings suggest that height may only a¤ect fertility through its
indirect impact on both marriage success and polygyny. Therefore, height can be used as an
instrument for polygyny when estimating the e¤ect of polygyny on fertility. Indeed, if taller
women are more valued as spouses and are more likely to marry polygynous men, then a pop-
ulation with a large proportion of tall women, all other things being equal, should experience
a higher frequency of marriages.
We estimate the e¤ect of regional polygyny prevalence on the number of children born to a
woman in a relationship, nding a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect (Table 6, Column
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(I)). This e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of regional averages of age, education, religion, infant
mortality, female adult mortality and infecundity, and country xed e¤ects.
We use the regional average height as an instrument for regional polygyny prevalence.
Average height positively a¤ects polygyny prevalence, with the e¤ect being robust to the
inclusion of all the variables mentioned above. The system is identied as the number of
instrument matches the number of endogenous variables. When instrumented for by average
height, polygyny prevalence increases the number of children by 3.8 (Table 6, Column (II)),
which is statistically positive but not statistically di¤erent from the OLS-estimated e¤ect (Ta-
ble 6, Column (I)). Furthermore, an endogeneity test (not shown) shows that OLS estimates
are consistent (P-value is 0.08). Restricting the sample to women in monogamous unions
provides similar ndings. However, in that case, an endogeneity test indicates that OLS esti-
mates are not consistent (P-value is 0.03). Therefore it is likely that an unbiased estimate of
the impact of polygyny on fertility is actually higher than the 0.70 multiplier estimated using
OLS.
Notice that this e¤ect cannot be viewed as reecting the notion that taller women are
healthier on average as many direct measures of health status - such as (i) absence of period,
(ii) infecundity, (iii) female adult survival rates, (iv) infant mortality, and (v) the overall health
system e¤ectiveness embedded into country xed e¤ects - are already taken into account in
the regressions.
[Table 6]
Moreover, although height may be correlated with health status at the individual level, at
the aggregate level, variation in average height depends much more heavily on genetic varia-
tions (Schultz 2002), which are independent of health status. In fact in the developed world
where polygyny is non-existent, cross country variations in average height are not positively
correlated with fertility. To verify this assumption and take advantage of cross-country vari-
ations in polygyny, one can run the same regressions without the country xed e¤ects. Also,
and as already noted, we control for infecundity.
In results not shown, we also use average height and the legal status of polygyny in a
country as instruments for polygyny prevalence. We distinguish between polygyny being
recognized as a legal union, polygyny being tolerated as a custom union, and polygyny being
banned. We nd that cross-country variations in both average height and legal status of
polygyny are good predictors of polygyny prevalence. We also nd that polygyny prevalence
has a positive ans statistically signicant e¤ect on the number of children produced by a
woman.
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5.4 Robustness checks
This section examines whether the documented e¤ect of polygyny on fertility is robust to
cultural traits favoring gender di¤erentiation, male domination, and fertility.
We make the underlying assumption that male-dominant societies tend to conne women
to a reproductive role. In such societies, spouses and thus children are seen as signs of wealth,
and men tend to accumulate both to increase their social status. If this assumption is valid,
variables related to gender discrimination and male domination should explain both the levels
of fertility and the practice of polygyny. These variables capture social norms and customs.
We therefore compute indicators averaged at the regional level. By controlling for these
variables, we will be able to check the robustness of the estimates of polygyny prevalence
on individual-level female fertility. Particularly, if the e¤ect of polygyny prevalence becomes
insignicant, the correlation between that variable and fertility only reects the local culture
and cannot be interpreted as causal.
As polygyny is correlated with lower age at rst marriage, higher fertility and lower levels
of schooling for women, this suggests these variables can be used as proxies for a conservative
culture, and they might indicate that tasks and roles for men and women within the household
and the society are greatly polarized. The DHS provide rich information on these variables,
which allows us to capture cultural values and behaviors. We use di¤erent indicators to
measure cultural beliefs and behaviors:
 Tolerance for domestic violence: In the DHS, women are asked if they believe a
husband is justied to beat his wife if she refuses to have sex. The tolerance of domestic
violence from the womens side is a signal of male domination.
 Bias toward male children: A way to measure bias for men in the society is to look
at preferences regarding the gender of children. In the DHS, women are asked about the
idealnumber of boys (#boys) and girls (#

girls) they would like to have. This allows us
to compute an indicator of gender biasas in equation (17):
biasboys =
#boys  #girls
#boys + #

girls
(17)
When there is no bias, biaisboys is equal to zero. The measure biaisboys is positive when
there is a bias toward boys and negative when there is a bias toward girls.
 Control of money: The money of the household may be managed primarily by men or
women. If men exclusively manage the households nances, this signals a lack of trust
in women or a lack of female independence.
 Duration of breast-feeding: Longer breast-feeding periods are often associated with
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longer durations of postpartum amenorrhoea18 and abstinence, which may favor polyg-
yny as well.
 Family planning: Women in the DHS are also asked several questions about whether
they discuss family planning with their husband, whether they approve family plan-
ning19, whether their husband approve family planning, and whether they already had
a terminated pregnancy.20
These variables are averaged at the regional level and by year of survey. Their partial
correlations are reported in Table 7. These variables are good candidates with which to
measure gender bias and describe a conservative culture. On the one hand, tolerance for
violence against wives, bias toward male children, family planning approval and terminated
pregnancies are strongly or moderately correlated with fertility, marriages and the prevalence
of polygyny. On the other hand, the control of money by men, breastfeeding and abstinence
after delivery are correlated with polygyny.
[Table 7]
To test whether the correlation between polygyny and fertility is due to culture, we add
the aforementioned variables in the fertility regression (equation 16). Results are reported in
Table 8.
[Table 8]
We nd that although all the added variables simultaneously explain polygyny, fertility
and marriage, they do not explain the correlation between polygyny prevalence and number of
children born to a woman. It follows that this correlation is unlikely to be purely an artefact
of local cultural particularities.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple network theory of a mating economy that has implica-
tions for marital success, the characteristics of men and women who enter into a polygynous
marriage, and for how polygyny a¤ects individual and aggregate level fertility. We nd that
beautiful women are more likely to be married, which implies that they are more likely to have
a child. When polygyny is allowed, these women are more likely to be married to high status
18Absence of menstrual period, often induced by a recent pregnancy and breastfeeding.
19In practice approval rates for family planning by men and women are highly correlated at the regional
level (0.90), therefore, we only use mens attitudes towards family planning as a control variable, as it is more
highly correlated with our variables of interest.
20This is a rough indicator of abortion as it counts all pregnancies that were not completed, whether naturally
or not.
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men, who naturally attract other women. Therefore, female beauty increases the chance of
entering into a polygynous relationship.
Being married to a polygynous man negatively a¤ects fertility as long as the preference for
children relative to other consumption goods is not too strong. However, at the societal level,
the practice of polygyny increases aggregate fertility by increasing the number of marriages
and by positively a¤ecting individual-level fertility through a contagion e¤ect. Our analysis
is the rst that reconciles the apparently paradoxical e¤ects of polygyny on fertility at the
individual and aggregate levels. We have tested and validated the key predictions of the model
using household surveys from several countries.
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Appendix: Building the individual infant mortality rate
A.1) Assumption and framework
We assume that an infants probability of death is the sum of a function () of observable
individual characteristics X and an idiosyncratic factor z. That is:
 = (X) + z (B.1)
Let n be the total number of children and k the number of deaths. The observed mortality
rate m, can only take discrete values which depend on n:
m =
k
n
2
np
n
: p = 1; :::; n
o
(B.2)
The law of probability of m thus depends on n and  as follows:
P

k
n
jn; 

=
n
k

()k(1  )n k (B.3)
Using the Bayes formula, we can express  as a function of m:
P (jn;m) = P (mjn; ) P()R
P (mjn; ) P() (B.4)
To compute this probability, we need to dene a prior distribution for z.
A.2) Using beta distributions to model priors
Using a uniform distribution for the prior distribution leads to unrealistic posterior distribu-
tions for small numbers of children n. We therefore retain a beta distribution   B(; ),
and denoting   the Gamma function21, one has:
P() = g() =  ( + )
 () ()
() 1(1  ) 1 (B.5)
 and  parameters can be set to replicate the expectancy E and the variance V of any prior
distribution of :
 =
E2(1  E)
V
  E ,  = (1  E)
E
(B.6)
The posterior probability of , given k and n, remains a beta distribution:
P(jk; n) = ()
k+ 1(1  )n k+ 1R 1
0
xk+ 1(1  x)n k+ 1dx )   B(k + ; n  k + ) (B.7)
21 (z) =
R1
0
tz 1e tdt,  (n) = (n  1)! if n is an integer.
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Therefore, we can deduce the posterior expectancy of the sought probability  using the
proprieties of the Beta distribution:
E
h
jk; n
i
= E
h
B(k + ; n  k + )
i
=
k + 
n+  + 
(B.8)
The posterior expectancy can be rewritten as a linear combination of the prior expectancy
E0[] and the observable mortality rate m. The weights depend of the expectancy and the
variance of the prior distribution and the number of children.
E
h
jm;n
i
= m
n
n+ wE;V
+ E0[]
wE;V
n+ wE;V
, wE;V =
E0(1  E0)
V 0
  1 (B.9)
As expected, the Bayesian estimates relies more on the prior for the women with few children.
Also, the more accurate the prior distribution is (i.e., the smaller the variance V 0), the more
the prior distribution matters for the posterior estimates.
A.3) Empirical estimation of the individual probability of infant mortality
We start by calculating the average mortality rate for babies born in a period t for each region
and area (rural or urban) r, mortrt . We distinguish the period 1960-1979
22 from each of the
ve year periods between 1980 and 2010. The indicator mortrt is calculated as the ratio of the
total number of infants dead to the total number of children born in a given area and period.
It captures external factors (i.e., factors not related to parents) which a¤ect infant mortality.
We control for it in a probit model to estimate E0. We regress, for each country, the actual
mortality rate m on variables listed in equation (B.10) below, where tp1 is the year of the
womans rst pregnancy, ap1 and a2p1 are respectively the age of the womans rst pregnancy
and its quadratic, and h is the womans years of schooling .
P(m) =   0 + ttp1 + aap1 + aaa2p1 + hh+ rmortrt (B.10)
The expectancy E0 is therefore:
E0  P

mijtp1; ap1; hi;mortrt

(B.11)
It is di¢ cult to estimate V 0 for such a regression. We will assume therefore that:
V 0  (E0)2 (B.12)
22Because all DHS surveys only focus on women less than 50, only a few children are born before 1980.
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Table 1: Averages of the main variables by country (computed for women 15-49 years old)
# children Involved Polygyny Ideal # children Schooling Mortality # obs.
Burkina Faso 3.4 79.6 49.3 8.5 1.3 71.4 18,831
Benin 3.2 75.1 45.1 7.0 2.1 54.3 29,504
Burundi? 2.7 57.7 7.3 5.5 3.1 43.4 9,389
Congo, Dem.? 3.0 66.3 28.8 8.2 5.3 66.0 9,995
Centrafrique 2.9 69.4 28.5 10.7 2.2 55.0 5,884
Congo? 2.3 55.9 16.1 8.0 7.7 37.0 19,464
Cote dIvoire 2.6 58.5 31.0 6.0 3.3 48.1 2,825
Cameroon 2.9 68.5 32.9 9.3 5.2 53.0 2,0028
Ethopia? 3.0 63.4 12.1 8.0 2.1 57.1 45,952
Gabon 2.5 54.1 22.0 7.3 6.9 41.1 6,183
Ghana 2.6 63.8 23.3 5.5 6.0 42.7 2,0012
Guinea 3.4 80.7 52.9? 7.5 1.5 70.1 14,707
Kenya 2.9 60.2 17.2 5.1 7.0 44.6 32,060
Liberia 3.2 64.0 21.8 6.6 3.8 70.2 15,428
Madagascar 3.0 65.6 5.5? 6.8 4.1 50.6 38,644
Mali 3.8 84.3 42.1 10.6 1.3 73.1 37,136
Malawi 3.1 71.4 17.1 5.6 4.1 71.9 29,767
Mozambique 3.3 71.3 26.4 7.2 2.7 85.0 32,409
Nigeria 3.0 69.8 35.0 11.1 5.3 62.6 59,596
Niger 3.9 85.9 36.0 11.7 0.8 83.4 15,726
Namibia 2.1 37.9 23.8 4.6 7.5 34.0 21,980
Rwanda? 2.8 50.7 12.3 5.2 3.7 56.0 28,293
Sierra Leone 3.0 74.9 39.4 6.3 2.6 81.3 7,374
Senegal 2.7 68.3 43.3 10.1 2.5 42.8 48,946
Swaziland 2.3 41.3 33.9 2.7 8.1 51.1 4,987
Chad 3.6 77.5 39.2 12.3 1.0 73.2 13,539
Togo 2.9 67.9 42.8 6.6 2.6 51.4 8,569
Tanzania 2.9 64.0 23.4 7.1 5.1 58.8 48,034
Uganda 3.5 67.2 30.9 6.3 4.5 63.5 22,847
South Africa 1.9 43.3 11.2 3.1 8.7 41.3 11,735
Zambia 3.1 61.8 16.4 6.4 5.8 66.2 29,885
Zimbabwe 2.4 59.9 16.6 4.3 7.5 37.2 20,942
Involvedis the percentage of women involved in a relationship, whether it is a legal union or not.
Polygynyis the percentage of women involved with a man who has other wives, whether it is legal or not.
? denotes countries where polygyny is prohibited.
Schoolingis the average years of schooling.
Mortalityis the number of children (over 1,000) who died before reaching the age of one.41
Table 2: The e¤ect of height on marriage, polygyny, sex and fertility
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Probit Probit Probit OLS
Involved in a In polygynous Has at least # children
relationship union one child born?
Height 0:25
(5:0)
0:14
(4:0)
0:13
(6:8)
0:2
(1:2)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.21
# observations 447,043 310,389 430147 352,339
? Analysis restricted to fecund women.
T-statistics or Z-statistics are in parentheses. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Controls: Age, year of survey, years of schooling, rural, religion, country xed e¤ects.
Standard deviations are computed by clustering observations by country.
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Table 3: Probit e¤ects of regional polygyny prevalence on nuptiality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Is not single Is not divorced/widow
Polygynyj;k 0:38
(2:9)
 0:34
(2:9)
 0:16
(2:5)
  0:17
5:4)
  0:18
(6:2)
  0:07
(2:3)

Educationj;k  0:003
(0:4)
 0:004
(0:6)
 0:01
(2:9)
 0:001
(0:9)
0:001
(0:7)
 0:001
(1:7)
Religionj;k NO YES YES NO YES YES
Country NO NO YES NO NO YES
# observations 437,553 437,553 437,553 333,665 333,665 333,665
pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.10
Sample All women Excluding never married women.
T-statistics are in parentheses. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Additional controls: Age, age2, years of schooling, rural area, year trend, height,
a dummy for fecundity, religion dummies.
Standard deviations are computed by clustering observations by country.
The superscripts j;k indicate that the variable is computed at the region/generation level.
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Table 4: OLS e¤ect of being married to a polygynist on number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Married to a polygynist  0:01
(0:4)
0:02
(0:9)
 0:05
(1:8)
 0:06
(3:1)
  0:08
(3:6)
  0:10
(4:2)

Union duration No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of unions No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. child mortality No No No No Yes Yes
Fixed e¤ects None Country None Country Country Regions
& Years
# observations 461,301 461,301 453,439 453,439 439,910 438,205
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.60
T-statistics are in parentheses. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Additional controls: Age, age2, years of schooling, rural, year trend, average infant mortality
in the region at the age of rst birth, and religion.
Standard deviations are computed by clustering observations by country.
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Table 5 : OLS e¤ect of regional polygyny prevalence on number of children (contagion)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Married to a polygynist  0:10
(9:9)
  0:10
(9:9)
  0:10
(10:6)
 - - -
Polygynyj;k 0:71
(4:4)
 0:69
(4:3)
 0:47
(2:7)
 0:68
(4:4)
 0:68
(4:2)
 0:49
(2:7)

Infecundj;k No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Amenorrheaj;k No No Yes No No Yes
# obs. 353,151 353,151 349,266 254,116 254,116 254,116
adjusted R2 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.64
Sample All women in a relationship Monogamous women
T-statistics are in parentheses. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level.
Additional controls: Age, age2, years of schooling, rural, year trend, marriage duration,
a dummy for being ever married more than once, country xed e¤ects, individual-level infant mortality,
religion dummies, religion shares (region level), womens regional survival rate.
Standard deviations are computed by clustering observations at the region/generation level.
The superscripts j;k indicate that the variable is computed at the region/generation level.
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Table 6: OLS and IV e¤ect of regional polygyny prevalence on number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
OLS IV OLS IV
Married to a polygynist  0:10
(10:5)
 0:18
(3:6)
- -
Polygynyj;k 0:77
(5:3)
3:59
(1:9)
0:86
(5:3)
3:57
(2:3)
Children mortalityj;k 10:80
(13:0)
11:41
(13:3)
9:28
(11:6)
10:06
(11:9)
Female survival ratej;k 0:27
(0:7)
 0:02
(0:2)
0:24
(0:7)
 0:06
(0:1)
Fecundityj;k 1:01
(2:3)
1:78
(3:0)
0:63
(1:3)
1:55
(2:7)
Amenorrheaj;k  0:73
(1:4)
 0:59
(1:0)
 0:76
(1:5)
 0:59
(1:0)
Sample All women in a relationship Monogamous women
R2 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.65
# observations 427,222 422,445 305,882 301,573
T-statistics are parentheses. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Additional controls: Age, age2, years of schooling, rural, year trend, marriage duration, a dummy for being
ever married more than once, country xed e¤ects, individual infant mortality, religion dummies
(individual), religion shares (region level), years of schooling (region level), generation xed e¤ects
Instruments for polygynyj;k: all variables and average height at the region/generation level.
Standard deviations are computed by clustering observations at the region/generation level.
The superscripts j;k indicate that the variable is computed at the region/generation level.
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Table 7: Partial correlations of number of children, marriage, and polygyny
with cultural variables at the regional level
# children Married (%) Polygyny (%)
Tolerance for beating 0:56 0:50 0:40
Bias toward boys 0:27 0:34 0:33
Money control  0:07  0:14  0:43
Male family planning approval  0:40  0:48  0:57
Family planning is discussed  0:51  0:60  0:66
Termination 0:25 0:24 0:25
Breastfeeding 0:05  0:01  0:11
Abstinence  0:08 0:01 0:25
Amenorrhea 0:24 0:16 0:02
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Table 8: E¤ects of polygyny prevalence and gender bias on number of children
Dependent Variable: Number of children
Polygynyj;k 0:71
(4:3)
 0:68
(2:9)
 0:96
(4:6)
 0:73
(3:3)
 0:71
(3:3)

Tolerance for beating j;k - 0:42
(3:3)
 - - 0:57
(3:4)

Bias toward boysj;k - 0:78
(1:5)
- - -
Money controlj;k - 0:12
(0:9)
- - -
Breast-feedingj;k - -  0:03
(4:0)
 -  0:02
(1:7)
Abstinencej;k - -  0:06
(9:6)
 -  0:07
(8:6)

Amenorrheaj;k - -  0:04
(2:8)
 -  0:05
(2:9)

Family planning approvalj;k - - -  0:04
(0:2)
-
Family planning discussionj;k - - - 0:29
(2:4)
 -
Terminationj;k - - - 0:27
(0:8)
-
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.62 0.68
# observations 353,151 246,939 276,593 156,166 197,550
T-statistics are in parentheses brackets. ; ; indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
Additional controls: Age, age2, years of schooling (individual and region/generation level), rural, year trend,
a dummy for being married to a polygynist, marriage duration, a dummy for being ever married more than
once, infant mortality (individual and region/generation level), religion dummies (individual and
region/generation level), adult mortality (region/generation level), country xed e¤ects.
The superscripts j;k indicate that the variable is computed at the region/generation level.
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Table A: DHS surveys used
Countries Polygyny status DHS II DHS III DHS IV DHS V DHS VI
Benin Abolished (2004) 1996 2001 2006
Burkina-Faso Legal 1993 2003
Burundi Abolished (1993) 1996 2001 2006
Cameroon Legal 1991 1998 2004
Central African R. Legal 1994
Chad Legal 1997 2004
Congo Legal 2005, 2009
Congo dem. Unlawful 2007
Cote dIvoire Abolished (1964) 1994, 1998 2005
Ethiopia Unlawful 1992 1997 2003
Gabon Legal 2000
Ghana Legal 1993 1998, 2003 2008
Guinea Legal 1999 2005
Kenya Legal 1993, 1998 2003 2009
Lesotho Legal 2004 2009
Liberia Legal 2007, 2009 2011
Madgascar Unlawful 1992 1997 2003
Malawi Legalized (2004) 1992 2000, 2004 2008
Mali Legal 1996 2001 2006
Mozambique Legal 1997 2003 2009
Namibia Legal 1992 2000 2007
Niger Legal 1992 2006
Nigeria Legal 1990 1999, 2003 2008
Rwanda Unlawful 1992 2000 2005
Senegal Legal 1992 1997 2005
Sierra Leone Legal 2008
South Africa Legal 1998
Tanzania Legal 1991 1996 1999, 2004 2007
Togo Legal 1998
Uganda Legal 1995 2000 2006
Zambia Legal 1992 1996 2002 2007
Zimbabwe Legal 1994 1999 2005
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